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The purpose of the project was to assess whether the first spontaneous movements
of a computer mouse, when making an assessment on a scale presented on the
screen, may express a respondent’s implicit attitudes. In Study 1, the altruistic behaviors
of 66 students were assessed. The students were led to believe that the task they
were performing was also being performed by another person and they were asked
to distribute earnings between themselves and the partner. The participants performed
the tasks under conditions with and without distractors. With the distractors, in the
first few seconds spontaneous mouse movements on the scale expressed a selfish
distribution of money, while later the movements gravitated toward more altruism. In
Study 2, 77 Polish students evaluated a painting by a Polish/Jewish painter on a scale.
They evaluated it under conditions of full or distracted cognitive abilities. Spontaneous
movements of the mouse on the scale were analyzed. In addition, implicit attitudes
toward both Poles and Jews were measured with the Implicit Association Test (IAT).
A significant association between implicit attitudes (IAT) and spontaneous evaluation
of images using a computer mouse was observed in the group with the distractor.
The participants with strong implicit in-group favoritism of Poles revealed stronger
preference for the Polish painter’s work in the first few seconds of mouse movement.
Taken together, these results suggest that spontaneous mouse movements may reveal
egoism (in-group favoritism), i.e., processes that were not observed in the participants’
final decisions (clicking on the scale).
Keywords: “mouse” technique, Implicit Association Test, implicit attitude measure, altruism, altruistic behavior
INTRODUCTION
Measurement of processes that are less controlled, automatized, or unconscious has been of
particular interest in psychology from the very beginning. In experimental psychology, the division
of processes into automatic vs. controlled appeared in the 1970s in research on attention (Shiffrin
and Schneider, 1977). It was proposed that automatic processing requires no effort, is done
unconsciously (though it may also be conscious), beyond one’s attention and intentional control.
Basically, it does not depend on the cognitive resources and motivation to make an effort.
Controlled processes, on the other hand, are executed when the subject draws attention to a certain
object and makes a cognitive effort. They are sequential, conscious, and dependent on the person’s
goals and intentions. They, therefore, require motivation and cognitive resources.
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In the late 1970s the controlled/automated process distinction
that originated from cognitive psychology was adopted into the
field of social psychology, especially in the domains of attitudes
and altruism research.
Research conducted to understand how attitudes operate
contributed to the development of two competing paradigms.
Within the first of them, researchers assumed that attitudes
are constructed in a specific situational context, e.g., they are
inferred from current thoughts and feelings (Tesser, 1978), mood
(Schwarz and Clore, 1983), and behavioral observations (Bem,
1972). The basic assumption behind the second paradigm is that
attitudes constitute relatively permanent evaluations stored in
the memory (Fazio, 1986). In this paradigm, Fazio et al. (1986)
observed that the mere presence of an object may automatically
activate its evaluations as stored in the memory. This process
occurs effortlessly and without the participation of consciousness
(Fazio et al., 1989; Bargh et al., 1992; Blascovich et al., 1993).
This phenomenon has allowed for a better understanding of the
influence of attitudes on behavior. Fazio (1986) and Fazio and
Towles-Schwen (1999) called it a spontaneous process because
it was activated by mere contact with the object of the attitudes.
Attitudes serve as orienting values (Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio,
1992), i.e., as direct attention of the subject on the objects, which
should either be avoided or approached.
In the 1980s an attempt to reconcile the results of these two
lines of research, i.e., attitude as a temporary structure vs. a record
in the memory, resulted in a dual understanding of attitudes.
It was assumed that an attitude is differently expressed in the
two systems, e.g., reflective vs. automatic, systematic vs. heuristic,
and conscious vs. unconscious (Chaiken and Eagly, 1983; Petty
and Cacioppo, 1984; Bargh, 1999; Chaiken and Trope, 1999;
Smith and DeCoster, 2000). The division between two kinds of
attitudes, each connected with a distinct system, was introduced
by Greenwald and Banaji (1995), who proposed the notion of
implicit attitudes. They defined it as “a trace of past experience
that influences favorable or unfavorable feelings, thoughts and
actions toward social objects, although this trace of memory
remains introspectively unidentified or identified inaccurately”
(p. 8). Wilson et al. (2000) assumed that implicit attitude is
different from explicit attitude, so the subject can have two, often
evaluatively different, attitudes toward the same object (e.g., I
like cigarettes; cigarettes cause cancer). Implicit attitude is related
to the automatic system, while explicit attitude is related to the
reflective system (cf. Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006). A large
body of research suggests that if the implicit attitude is formed
and operates in the “automatic” system, it is strongly associated
with spontaneous behaviors that are undertaken without the
effort and control of the subject (Dovidio et al., 1997; Marsh
et al., 2001; McConnell and Leibold, 2001; Perugini, 2005). The
hypothesis regarding the impact of implicit attitude in automatic
conditions is also supported by neuroimaging (fMRI) studies
(Cunningham et al., 2004). These suggest that the first few
seconds of any reaction can be regulated by the implicit attitude,
i.e., it is automatically activated in the presence of the object of
an attitude and it will determine the first reactions to the object
(i.e., at least in a short period of time; the first second). The
subject needs time to apply explicit attitudes (cf. Wilson et al.,
2000). Explicit attitude can take over the regulatory role only after
some time. In this article we verified the hypothesis regarding
the dynamics of the impact on the behavior of implicit attitudes.
A similar research problem was identified in the debate over
whether intuition promotes either altruism or egoism.
Dual-Process Framework of Altruistic vs.
Egoistic Behavior
Apart from the usefulness of the dual-process framework in the
area of attitude research, its application proved to be fruitful
in the study of mechanisms underlying altruistic vs. egoistic
behaviors.
The studies were aimed at answering the basic question
whether people are intuitively inclined to cooperate or whether
they behave selfishly on the automatic level and altruism requires
time and cognitive resources (Rand et al., 2012; Capraro and
Cococcioni, 2015; Corgnet et al., 2015).
One approach suggests that pursuing self-interest is an
automatically activated goal, while pro-social behavior requires
cognitive resources. Traditional economic and evolutionary
models also assume that people are predisposed toward
selfishness (Dawkins, 1976; Myers, 1983; Axelrod and Hamilton,
1984). However, several researchers have reported results that
directly oppose this commonly held belief.
Rand et al. (2012) showed that intuition promoted by
cognitive load increased generosity in resource allocation.
Furthermore, forcing subjects to decide quickly increased
contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and forcing
them to decide slowly decreased contributions. Finally, an
instruction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increased
contributions as compared to an instruction that promotes
greater reflection. To explain these results, Rand et al. (2012)
proposed that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative
heuristics are useful in daily life in which cooperation is
advantageous. If decisions were based on a more elaborated
thinking process, pursuing self-interest would be dominating.
The conclusion that people are intuitively cooperative in social
dilemma games was challenged by several researchers. Tinghög
et al. (2013) studied the robustness of the findings of Rand
et al. (2012) in a series of experiments involving about 2,500
participants. None of the experiments confirmed Rand et al.’s
(2012) findings, indicating that their result was an artifact of
excluding about 50% of subjects who had failed to respond on
time. Results of the studies by Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester
(2014) also failed to reveal an intuitive-cooperation effect.
One of the ways to explain the differences between these
opposite results (i.e., showing or not that intuition promotes
altruistic behavior) is to assume that they captured different
automatic reactions; for instance, both Pavlovian (inborn) and
habitual (learned) processes may operate automatically and
sometimes may give different results (Ge˛siarz and Crockett,
2015). The habitual system emits actions based on the
reinforcement history, and the Pavlovian system promotes
reactions based on evolutionarily prescribed priors.
However, Pavlovian or habitual processes do not always
promote a particular kind of behavior (pro-social or pro-self).
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Some pro-social processes are triggered by old, evolutionary
mechanisms embedded in the Pavlovian system; nonetheless,
pro-social behaviors can also be learned and automated, e.g.,
cooperative heuristics.
An additional factor that should be taken into consideration
when explaining the differences between the results of the
relationship between automated behavior and pro-social
behavior is time dynamics. In a study by Piovesan and
Wengström (2009), decisions made quickly were pro-self;
those made after some time were more pro-social (the money
was divided more equally). We interpreted the results as that
the quick decisions require very simple mechanisms, e.g., the
decisions may be the result of an automatically activated goal,
e.g., pursuing self-interest. Much of the goal pursuit is now
known to occur without one’s awareness or intent, i.e., it can be
automatically triggered (Chartrand and Bargh, 1996; Gollwitzer,
1999). Moreover, currently activated goals may impact other
automated reactions, i.e., either inhibit or enhance them
(Gollwitzer, 1999). Not only goals but also habitual processes and
norms are automatically activated. Acting according to the norm
of fairness by providing an equal endowment is an example of
this mechanism (Konow, 2010). Following this interpretation,
with time people may change their automatic responses from
pro-self to pro-social ones. Piovesan and Wengström (2009)
observed that the longer it took to make a decision, the more
pro-social it was. This interpretation became the rationale to set
a new research goal, i.e., to check whether there exists a dynamics
of decision making on the automatic level of processing (first
a pro-self decision is made, and with time it shifts toward a
pro-social one).
We assumed that different parallel mechanisms of the
decision-making process during social interactions may operate
on an automatic level, but it is not necessarily possible to
capture the influence in the frame of dual-process theory because
in previous research only the final, automatic decisions were
measured. In the following project we examined the temporal
dynamics of this process by checking both the first spontaneous
reactions and the final decisions. It was predicted that the first
spontaneous behavior would be more egoistic (implementation
of the self-interest goal) and then became more altruistic (which
was studied and reported in dual-process perspective research,
comp. Rand et al., 2012, 2014).
Indirect Measures and the Necessity of
Time Dynamics
Explicit attitudes are measured directly, by using a questionnaire.
The subjects are asked directly about the relationship to the object
(direct measurement). Responses are expressed, among others,
as on the Likert scale, Thurston’s scale or semantic differential.
This measurement method assumes that the person wants and
can express his/her attitude.
Direct measurements are not applicable in the case of implicit
attitudes, i.e., one cannot directly investigate the relationship to
the object while the participant is not aware of this relationship.
The measurement of implicit attitudes requires the use of indirect
measures.
Methods for indirect measurement of attitudes became
popular in the 1970s and 1980s (Fazio et al., 1986; Bargh et al.,
1992; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). The most popular methods
were derived from the implicit memory test (implicit memory),
which was based on the phenomenon of priming (e.g., Neely,
1977; for a review, see Lewandowsky et al., 1989). An example
of such measures of implicit attitudes is affective priming (e.g.,
Fazio et al., 1986, 1995; De Houwer et al., 1998; Fazio, 2001; Fazio
and Olson, 2003).
Another way of estimating implicit attitudes is to study
categorization processes, which are the basis of the Implicit
Association Test (abbreviated as IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998).
An indicator of implicit attitudes in the test is the difference
between the time of classifying objects into categories when
categories are arranged in pairs that are affectively consistent
or inconsistent (IAT description, see Study 2); for example,
the person performing the IAT is biased and has a negative
association with Jews. If in the IAT a Jewish person is paired
with unpleasant stimuli and a Polish person with pleasant stimuli,
the categorization of objects is easy and the prejudiced person
performs the tasks quickly. On the other hand, if the task
is inconsistent (“a pleasant Jewish” and “an unpleasant Polish
person”), then the categorization is difficult and the response time
is longer. On the basis of the difference in the reaction to these
two tasks, both the character (positive vs. negative) and strength
of the attitude can be determined. The measurement is indirect,
as the examined person does not know that the difference in the
reaction time is an indicator of his/her attitude.
Another group of techniques of indirect measurement
of implicit attitudes is based on recording the approach
vs. avoidance reaction toward a given object. The Implicit
Association Procedure (IAP; Schnabel et al., 2006) may serve as
an example. Similar to the IAT, the IAP aims to assess automatic
associations between concepts (e.g., “pleasant,” “Polish,” “Jewish”)
through a series of discrimination tasks. Instead of categorizing
stimuli by using a key on the keyboard, participants, in front of
the monitor, express their attitudes to the object on the screen
by using a joystick. If the object is close to them, they move the
joystick toward themselves (approach), if they prefer to avoid
the object, they move the joystick away from themselves. The
IAP triggers the automatic approach and avoidance behavior via
two joystick movements (pushing it away or toward a target;
Neumann et al., 2004).
A disadvantage of the above methods is that they do not
allow us to study the dynamics of the object of evaluation. The
“mouse method” allows us to perform this type of measurement
(Vallacher and Nowak, 1999). In the method, subjects are asked
to express their feelings, attitudes, or evaluations by moving
a computer mouse, e.g., around a point on the screen that
symbolizes the evaluated object. The method is similar to
methods that were used in the 1970s to assess the attractiveness
of movies, i.e., the more the person liked a part of the movie,
the more he/she squeezed a “pear,” and if the following scenes
were “worse,” he/she weakened his/her squeeze on the pear.
In the mouse method a person expresses an opinion which is
being recorded. Then the person evaluates the statement by using
mouse movements, i.e., the more negative the attitude, the further
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from the center of the screen one places the mouse pointer. As a
consequence, not only is the final assessment recorded (the point
that the person chose), but also the dynamics of the change of
that assessment (the trace of the pointer). The mouse method was
meant to describe complex dynamics of mental processes.
Mouselab, a computer-based information board, provides data
regarding strategy classification in decision making (Johnson
et al., unpublished), but generally it can also be used in human
information processing research (Spivey et al., 2005; Glöckner
and Betsch, 2008; Koop and Johnson, 2011). The method involves
the presentation of options in a covered information matrix.
Participants uncover the outcomes of choice options by moving
the mouse cursor onto boxes. The information search proceeds
in steps which can be recorded by the program and which serve
as cues to identify decision strategies.
The present research introduces a modification of the two
“mouse methods.”
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
The purpose of the project was to assess whether the first
spontaneous movements of a computer mouse when making an
assessment on a scale presented on the screen may express the
implicit attitudes of the respondents. The subjects perform a task
on a computer screen, believing that only their final assessment
is recorded, e.g., the value they end up selecting on the scale.
They are not informed that the mouse movements they perform
while arriving at the final decision are continuously being
recorded. It is expected that the spontaneous mouse movements
preceding the final decision may express the participants’ implicit
reactions/attitudes.
In Study 1, the participants divided small sums of money
between themselves and the experimenter’s coworker. They could
split the money in a way that was more or less selfish. It was
predicted in our research that spontaneous mouse movements on
a scale would reveal more selfish distribution of the money in the
first few seconds. First the spontaneous movements would be the
result of an automatically activated goal, i.e., pursuing the self-
interest. Then, after a few seconds, the mouse movements on the
scale became more altruistic, because i.e., people act according to
the norm of fairness.
In Study 2, implicit attitudes were measured with the IAT
(attitudes toward Poles vs. Jews). We predicted a significant
association between implicit attitudes (IAT) and a spontaneous
evaluation of the objects (a painting made by a Pole vs. a
Jew) using a computer mouse. We assumed that the first few
seconds of any reaction are regulated by implicit attitudes. It is
automatically activated in the presence of the object of an attitude
and it will determine the first reactions to the object. The subject
needs time to apply explicit attitudes and there is a lag before
he/she can take over the regulatory role.
STUDY 1
The definition of egoism and altruism that was applied in
this project was based on the Social Orientations conception
(McClintock, 1972). It is based on game theory. Our research is
coherent with this tradition and its assumptions, so we defined
egoism (individualism) as care for one’s own welfare without
considering the welfare of others. A perfect egoist is a person
whose weight attached to the welfare of the self is equal to 1,
and to the welfare of others is equal to 0. Altruism was defined
as care for the welfare of others without considering welfare of
the self. A perfect altruist is a person whose weight attached to
the welfare of the self is equal to 0 while to the welfare of others
it is equal to 1. The concept is often measured by asking people
to distribute goods between themselves and another person.
Frequently, money is used as a good and the participant can
divide it between him/herself and his/her partner. In Study 1, a
Dictator Game was chosen. In it, two participants are paired. One
of them receives an amount of money and is instructed to divide
the money between him/herself and his/her partner. The size of
the dictator’s “donation” is a measure of altruism, or the degree
to which one is motivated to pursue the collective interest.
In the Dictator Game, intuition was promoted by cognitive
load (Cornelissen et al., 2011). Cognitive loads are elicited by
using distraction manipulation. Intuition is also promoted by
time pressure. Rand et al. (2012) asked participants to reach their
decision quickly (within 10 s). They did not have enough time to
think about their decisions, therefore the decisions were expected
to be made intuitively. We used both distraction manipulation
and time pressure to induce intuitive decision making (group
1). Under conditions of cognitive load and restricted time for
reflection, we wanted to obtain the most automatic and simplest
first reactions in the Dictator Game. No time pressure and
no cognitive load conditions promoted a deliberative decision
process (group 2).
Processes which constitute behavior can be categorized on a
scale from the most complex to the most automatic and simplest
(Nowak and Vallacher, 1998). Each complex adaptive system,
such as a human being, may pursue goals with varying degrees
of complexity depending on the availability of resources. In the
case of greater availability of resources, the optimal solution may
incorporate more complex processes, i.e., processes taking into
account the effects of the action, an assessment of the social
environment, or group norms. When the cognitive resources of
an individual are limited (due to the impact of distractors, a lack
of time), the simplest and most automatic processes are selected,
such as an automatically activated goal of pursuing the self-
interest. First, we predicted that in the first few seconds a person
would behave in a selfish manner. With the passage of time the
level of altruistic behavior as measured by the mouse procedure
should increase. Then the norm of fairness is applied, but its
use may require time and resources. Thus we predicted that this
relationship should be stronger when the distractor worked and
the application of the norm of fairness would take more time.
Method
Subjects
A total of 66 participants took part in the study. They were
recruited at the campus of Warsaw University (Faculty of
Psychology; age M = 19.48, SD = 0.662). The study took place in
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FIGURE 1 | Screen that served to distribute the money (the person pondered what sum to select and then clicked on it) under “the distractor.”
a computer room at the Faculty of Psychology. On average, each
participant required 15 min to complete the study.
Study Design
The first independent variable (between-group) was described
as the conditions for distributing the money (with or without
a distractor). The second independent variable (within-group)
was the time in which the reaction was measured (spontaneous
mouse movements were measured every 250 ms). The dependent
variable was the division of money (the position of the cursor on
the scale of graphics at the time the person was pondering and the
final decision).
Tools and Materials
The only tool used in the study was the “mouse paradigm.” This is
a computer method. At the bottom of the screen the subjects saw
a graphic scale distribution of money (0–5 PLN) (see Figure 1).
Clicking on this scale, the participants decided how much money
from a pool of 5 PLN they could spend on themselves and how
much on another (unknown) person. The higher the amount
of money the respondents chose for themselves, the more their
behavior was characterized as more selfish. We recorded not only
the final decisions (clicks), but also the moves of the computer
mouse while the participant was pondering the selection (the
positions of the cursor on the scale were measured every 250 ms,
which is a value expressed in pixels).
The distractor was a dynamic change in the background color
combined with a strong (with a frequency of every 50 ms)
flickering of the screen. In addition, information (in red color)
about the possible loss of money was displayed if the decision
was not made in 40 s. The number of seconds remaining was
displayed on the screen.
A total of 40 s was the limit to provide an answer under the
distraction condition. The subjects could respond in any time
period before the time limit. There was no time limit under the
no cognitive load conditions (subjects could deliberate for as long
as they wanted). Participants could see the (x, y) position of the
computer mouse (although we analyzed only the (x) projection of
the mouse on the response scale). The position of the computer
mouse was measured every 250 ms (1/4 s).
Procedure
Respondents were informed that the amount the person being
tested would receive for participating in the experiment was
not fixed in advance and would depend on what happened in
the study (“You can earn up to 5 PLN but you can also earn
nothing”). The experimenter asked the participant to take a seat
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in front of his/her computer and to follow the instructions on the
screen. Subjects in the study performed several “tasks.” They:
• learned about the use of the program interface
• answered demographic questions, about their mood and
state of finances
• completed a study of social orientation (Grzelak, 1982).
The participants did not receive any feedback about their
social orientation. They simply filled out the questionnaires.
After performing the above-described tasks (filling out the
questionnaires), information about the end of the study and
remuneration for the participant’s participation appeared on the
computer screen. The participants found out that they would be
paired with another person and that they had to divide the wages
(5 PLN) between themselves. In fact, the “other person” did not
exist. They were led to believe that the task they had performed
was also completed by another person sitting in another room,
located in a different part of the laboratory’s building. They
were informed that there was no opportunity to meet the other
person or to get to know who this person was. The participants
performed seven tasks and were led to believe that “the other
person had done” 10 tasks. The hypothesis stated that pro-self
decisions are preferred in the first seconds of the decision making.
A situation in which the amount of workload was unequal was
created in order to test this hypothesis. If the workload was equal,
the simple rule of equal division would be favored. If, on the other
hand, the participants had a higher workload, the situation would
not be diagnostic, as the pro-self decision would be the result of
arithmetic. As a result (with this hypothesis stated), the alleged
partner always performed 10 tasks and the participant did 7.
The next step was a draw as to which of the two divisions
(the participant’s or the other person’s) would be taken into
consideration. Every participant had the right to distribute the
money as there was no “other person.” After the draw process
the subjects saw a message on the computer screen that they
were “supposed to split the money between themselves and
their partners and this task will start in 10 s.” At the same
time, the scale on which they distributed the money appeared
below this message, i.e., at the bottom of the screen. The time
period was chosen after having conducted the pilot study. The
participants had no time to think about their decisions, as this was
a large amount of information. The participants were supposed to
become acquainted with the instructions and the scale in the first
10 s.
After 10 s (from the first appearance of the scale on the
computer screen and message about the task) they were asked
to point to the middle of the scale. From this time onward,
spontaneous mouse movements were measured. Then they were
asked to think about their decisions, to choose a final option on
the scale and to click on it (these requests also appeared on the
computer screen).
Clicking on this scale, the subjects decided how much money
from a pool of 5 PLN they would spend on themselves and how
much on the other person. In addition, the experimental group
was distracted: a flashing screen and elapsed time. A total of
40 s was the limit for the answer under the distraction condition.
Subjects could respond at any time before the time limit. There
was no limit under the no cognitive load conditions (they could
deliberate for as long as they wanted). At the end of the test the
participants received the money they had “won.”
Results
First, spontaneous mouse movements were analyzed. We used
raw data from the time the participants were asked to point to
the middle of the scale until they clicked on it. Variance analysis
with repeated measures was then calculated.
A significant main effect was observed for the temporal
dynamics of mouse movements. With the passage of time the
participants decreased the amount of money that they took for
themselves (“diminish selfishness”), F(48,1008) = 2.19, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.09.
There was also a significant main effect of the availability of
cognitive resources. During the decision-making process, and
before clicking, people granted more money to themselves when
they were in the distractor group than when they were in the
control group, F(1,20) = 5.48, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.22.
A key finding was the result of significant interaction
(Distribution of money by Time ∗ Resource availability) between
time and the availability of cognitive resources F(48,960) = 1.46;
p = 0.04, η2 = 0.07 (see Figure 2).
In the control group (no distractors), a slight gradual increase
in altruism was found (participants distributed more money to
others). In the experimental group this change was strong and
had a curvilinear structure.
The differences (between groups with a distractor and without
it) were stronger for participants who took more time to make a
decision (from 17 to 28 s).
The subjects could respond at any time before the 40-s time
limit. They differed in the time period of making spontaneous
mouse movements; some of the participants made a decision
more quickly, whereas others took longer. The participants made
a decision more quickly in the distractor group (M = 18,4 s) than
in the control group (M = 28,77 s), F(1,65) = 15.36; p < 0.01,
η2 = 0.19.
The data was normalized as a second step of analyzing the
results. The aim of the normalization was to compare different
parts of the spontaneous decision process. To better understand
this idea, we can imagine that the whole process of making
a decision takes 100% of the time, and we can divide it into
10% intervals, e.g., we can check the mouse movements of the
respondents during the first 30% of the time for thinking and
20% of the time before the end. Data was normalized after the
following formula:
length of time from the start of measuring to the finish (click)
for every person = Ti
size of a normalized time unit for person y i = ti where ti = Ti/t
of normalized time k = {0%; 10%; 20%; . . . . . . ; 100%}
Position of the computer mouse cursor for each person = X
Position of the computer mouse cursor in normalized time k
for each person i = Ski
Ski = Xi| ti∗ k.
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FIGURE 2 | Distribution of money (on a scale) as a function of time and the conditions of the distribution (with or without a distractor).
FIGURE 3 | Time-normalized responses. Distribution of money (on a scale) as a function of time and the conditions of the distribution (with or without a distractor).
The normalized results showed a similar pattern as the raw
data (see Figure 3). A significant main effect was observed for
the temporal dynamics of mouse movements. With the passage
of time the participants decreased the amount of money they
took for themselves, F(10,650) = 6.74, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.09.
Spontaneous mouse movements on the response scale revealed
egoistic weighing of the decision (splitting the money between
the partners and themselves) in about the first 30% of time of
thinking, after which it became more altruistic; for the square
function F(10,650) = 19,06, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.22. This pattern
was similar under conditions of low vs. high cognitive resources
availability. There was no significant interaction (Distribution
of money by Time ∗ Resource availability) between time and
the availability of cognitive resources F(10,650) = 1.46; p = 0.054,
η2 = 0.01.
Discussion
The mouse paradigm allowed us to show the dynamic process of
making a decision in the Dictator Game and gave some insight
into the academic debate as to whether people are intuitively
inclined to cooperate so that reflection will cause them to
behave selfishly. We observed that in the first few seconds the
participants may be more selfish. Then, after the first few seconds
have passed, their spontaneous mouse movements became more
altruistic. The selfish remuneration division was noted especially
with the distractor. There was no such significant difference
under conditions of low and high cognitive availability in the
normalized data. The pattern of results (first egoistic choices,
then altruistic ones) was similar in the two groups, but under
distraction conditions the participants made a decision more
quickly than in the control group. These differences in the
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time reactions explain the significant effects in the raw data but
were reduced after normalization, which led to an extension of
the pattern of reactions under the distractor conditions and a
reduction of the temporal dynamics in the “high availability”
group.
A low level of altruism with limited resources in a specific
situation was observed, among others, in a classic experiment by
Darley and Batson (1973). In this experiment it was a lack of time
that modified the desire to help students at the seminary (going
to a seminar devoted to “The Good Samaritan”). Only 10% of the
tested seminarians who were informed by the experimenters that
they were late for class in another building helped the person in
need that they met on the way. Yet as many as 63% of the “not-
in-a-hurry” seminarians helped the person. It can be assumed
that in this study the standard related to the parable of the
Good Samaritan was not automated enough to influence the
behavior in the absence of resources (time). This standard was
important (along with the entire system of values instilled in the
seminarians) only with the action at the controlled level, i.e., in
the absence of a cognitive demand. The behavior of the majority
of people “in a hurry” can be interpreted either as yielding to a
generally automated heuristics of hurrying up (“when in a hurry
I will not help”) replacing the detailed guidelines of behavior
in a given situation or (at least in some people) as yielding
to automated (and not revealed at a conscious level) egoistic
orientation (acquired during one’s life or innate, i.e., originally
automatic).
This study does not settle assumptions about the egoistic or
altruistic nature of a human being. The results confirm that
the participants divided the resources and favored themselves
despite the unequal workload situation. In the first seconds the
fact that the participants had less of a workload did not matter,
as they acted according to the activated self-interest goal. With
time, information concerning the workload could have been
considered while dividing the money.
Our results show that conflicting data concerning the impact
of limited cognitive resources on altruistic behavior may be
related to the dynamics of behavior, i.e., the most selfish choices
would be in the first spontaneous reactions. Then the choices
were more altruistic because the norm of fairness could have been
applied, i.e., if the subjects have them and the time to use them.
These results correspond with research by Rand et al. (2012).
The studies measured the final decision, not the process of its
being made. Therefore, this study may show that tracking the first
movements gives the opportunity to observe how the automatism
of meeting one’s own needs is replaced by the norm of fairness.
The results also have an alternative interpretation. People are not
selfish and are altruistic in nature, but their reaction depends on
the situation, i.e., the salience of cues in the performed task. The
Dictator Game and a chosen distraction task, i.e., information
about the possible loss of money, could have activated actions
focused on satisfying self-interest. Then people considered the
information that the participants had performed fewer tasks then
their partners and tended to give them more money. Information
about partners filling out more questionnaires then could lead
to the application of cooperative heuristics and to giving more
money to the partners.
The participants were supposed to become acquainted with
the instructions and the scale in the first 10 s. We consider this
a limitation of the interpretation of the study’s results, as some
participants might have processed the information beforehand.
Therefore even during reading the instructions the participants
were distracted (the flickering of the screen and the information
about the time pressure). In Study 2 a training task was added
to avoid the differences in the time length between the groups
caused by their becoming acquainted with the procedure.
STUDY 2
Recent polls that were conducted in Poland show that the
proportion of people declaring prejudice against Jews (the ethnic
minority, not the religious group) is decreasing (Maliszewski,
2011). This could be partially the result of the more widespread
norm of political correctness and internalization of egalitarian
values. Hence, the declared attitude may be the result of inference
about Jews on the basis of the respondents’ values and norms.
When the cognitive resources of an individual are limited, it is
difficult to take into account the overall situation and decide what
is and what is not incorrectly assessed. In such situations the most
automatic processes are selected. Their source may exist in the
memory patterns of associations, i.e., introspectively unidentified
(or inaccurately identified) traces of a past experience, thus
implicit attitudes. Studies in which attitudes were measured
by the IAT confirmed that Polish students preferred Poles as
compared to Jews on an implicit level (Maliszewski, 2011) despite
the fact that they declared no difference in attitudes between
them. It was important to study the conditions under which
people may apply to behavior those implicit attitudes.
Kraus’ meta-analysis Kraus’ (1995) of 88 studies on explicit
attitudes and behavior showed a moderate correlation of r = 0.38
between attitude and behavior. Greenwald and Banaji (1995)
expected that implicit attitudes would predict these behaviors
which explicit attitudes could not. The results of the first studies,
however, did not confirm these expectations. It turned out that
the implicit attitudes, measured by the IAT, were less related to
behavior than explicit attitudes (Karpinski and Hilton, 2001). The
reason for obtaining the results of a low attitude and behavior
relationship was that the behavior measured was not specific for
this particular type of attitude (cf. Dovidio et al., 1997; Marsh
et al., 2001; Perugini, 2005). McConnell and Leibold (2001)
demonstrated that implicit attitudes are strongly associated with
“spontaneous” behavior, which is undertaken without effort and
control of the entity, e.g., the length of the conversation or
eye contact. The explicit attitudes were highly correlated with
“thoughtful” behaviors, which are the result of considering an
existing situation.
Studies showing a stronger relationship between implicit
attitudes and spontaneous behaviors have suggested that the goal
of the research should not be to determine whether the implicit
attitude is a good predictor of behavior but rather under which
specific conditions it influences behavior. According to Wilson
et al. (2000), implicit attitudes are active when a person does
not have the resources or motivation to control its impact. On
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the other hand, when he or she has the cognitive resources and
motivation to bring the attitude from memory, that person’s
behavior is based rather on the explicit attitude than the implicit
one. These assumptions were tested in Study 2. In this experiment
the participants evaluated an image that had allegedly been
painted by either a Pole or a Jew. The implicit attitude could
manifest itself when one was thinking about an evaluation of the
image and when one moved the mouse but did not know that
his/her reactions were being recorded. It was expected, therefore,
that in a situation of low cognitive resource constraints the
individual would strongly favor Poles in comparison to Jews.
It was assumed that spontaneous evaluations would be more
favorable to their own group and less favorable to the foreign
group (i.e., in the case of Jews).
Method
Subjects
A total of 79 participants took part in the study. These
were students of Warsaw University (excluding the Faculty of
Psychology) living on the university campus (age M = 19.73;
SD = 0.828).
The Study Design
Independent variables: (1) conditions of attitude activation –
cognitive resources availability (without distraction) vs. limited
cognitive resources (when performed tasks are accompanied
by a distractor); (2) explicit attitude measured before the
experimental manipulation; (3) implicit attitude measured before
the experimental manipulation; (4) ethnicity of the painting’s
author – a Pole or a Jew. The dependent variable was a
spontaneous (figuring out) and final (click) evaluation of the
painting.
Tools and Materials
An indicator of an explicit attitude toward Poles and Jews
was the temperature that the person indicated on the feelings
thermometer (from −50 to +50◦C; the higher the temperature,
the more positive the attitude; details, please see Greenwald et al.,
1998).
Implicit attitudes were measured using the IAT (the applied
procedure by Greenwald et al., 2009). It was conducted
individually with the use of a computer. The person examined a
series of stimuli and classified them into appropriate categories
using two keys assigned to the response (“a” and “l”). Name
categories were displayed in the upper right- and left-hand corner
of the monitor, and the stimuli appeared on the screen (please see
Figure 4).
The computer recorded the time and accuracy of the response.
The test consists of seven blocks: three out of the seven tasks
in the IAT are single categorization tasks which are practice
blocks where the participants are exposed to stimuli and learn to
respond appropriately. The other four blocks are combined tasks,
where four categories are categorized simultaneously (e.g., Polish,
“pleasant” and Jewish, “unpleasant” words; see Table 1).
The first two tasks are simple categorizations in which a person
assigns stimuli to one of two categories:
(a) In the first task – pleasant (sun, holidays, joy, love, pleasure)
vs. unpleasant words (illness, death, poison, evil, failure);
(b) In the second task – pictures symbolizing target categories;
Jewish (five stimuli, e.g., the flag and emblem of Israel) vs.
Polish (five stimuli, e.g., the flag and emblem of Poland).
Blocks 3/4 and 6/7 constitute complex categorizations and are
a combination of the first two tasks. They consist in assigning
on-screen stimuli into one of four categories, arranged in pairs
in the upper corners of the screen (combined categories of tasks
1 and 2, e.g., Unpleasant or Jewish vs. Pleasant or Polish). They
are also divided into practice blocks (3 and 6; 30 categorizations
of stimuli) and crucial blocks (4 and 7; 40 categorizations of
stimuli). After the third task (e.g., Unpleasant or Polish vs.
Pleasant or Jewish), the sides of the test category are reversed (e.g.,
Unpleasant or Jewish vs. Pleasant or Polish). The order of these
blocks was counter-balanced across the participants. The analysis
uses the reaction times from the combined tasks. The difference
in the average response time for the initial combined blocks (3/4)
and the reversed combined blocks (6/7) is an indicator of implicit
attitudes.
In interpreting the IAT it is assumed that people are
able to give the same response to items in two categories
more quickly and more easily when those categories have the
same evaluative value (e.g., both are negative for prejudiced
respondents, unpleasant and Jewish) than when they are not (e.g.,
one is positive – Polish and one is negative – unpleasant).
The second tool that was used in the study was the “mouse
method.” Respondents evaluated an image that was placed in the
center of the screen. Beneath it was a signature – the name and
nationality of the author (e.g., Damian F., Polish, Anna T., Polish,
David B., Jewish, Martha S., a Jewish woman). The gender of the
image’s author was the same as the person being examined (e.g.,
David for a male, Anna for a female). At the bottom there was a
continuous scale marked “very much dislike” (on the left), “like
very much” (right) (see Figure 5). As in the first study, the results
were the positions of the cursor on the X axis measured from the
middle of the scale.
Procedure
The subjects were recruited from a student dormitory. First,
they filled out a questionnaire which included questions about
their age, gender and nationality, as well as their explicit attitude
toward both Jews and Poles. After completing the questionnaire,
the participants were seated in front of a computer. Then
the implicit attitude was measured using the IAT. After that,
behavior was studied by the “mouse method.” The subject was
told to imagine a conference which would bring together Jews,
Germans and Belarusians living in Poland as well as Poles. The
aim would be to evaluate three works that had been awarded
at the conference. First, a painting by a German artist would
be evaluated in a practice trial. Then the true purpose of
the study would take place – a student evaluated two images
whose authors were a Pole and a Jew (the order and image
associated with a Pole and a Jew were counter-balanced across
participants). Spontaneous mouse movements were measured
from the appearance of a new painting (there was no instruction
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FIGURE 4 | Example of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to measure implicit attitudes toward Poles and Jews.
TABLE 1 | Schematic illustration of the Implicit Association Test (IAT).
Task 1 2 3 and 4 5 6 and 7
Task description Category of affective
words
Category of words
which were the subject
of the study
Complex category –
words from the 1st and
2nd task
Category of words
which were the subject
of the study with an
inversed order
Complex category –
words from the 1st and
2nd task with an
inversed order
Category name <Unpleasant <Jewish <Unpleasant Jewish> <Unpleasant
Jewish Polish
Pleasant > Polish> Pleasant <Polish Pleasant
Polish> Jewish >
Stimuli words – objects
which are classified in a
particular category
sun> Polish national Polish <Catholic cemetery <Catholic cemetery
<death anthem> emblem> a child in a Israeli national anthem
(Hatikvah) >
holidays> <Israeli national
anthem (Hatikvah)
<Israeli flag skullcap> <illness
<illness sun>
<poison <death
joy>
The arrow next to the category represents the side of the computer screen next to which it was displayed. The arrow next to the stimuli word (examples) represents the
category which the world should be classified into. Columns with the gray background are crucial for the study.
to point the computer mouse to the middle of the scale; the
cursor remained in the place where the subjects had clicked
in the previous task). Depending on the group, the task was
performed under the following conditions: distractor absorbing
the cognitive resources (the participant was asked to count
backward from 100: 100, 99, 98, etc.), or with no distractor
(control condition). There was no time limit for this task. The
participants could see the (x, y) position of the computer mouse
[but only the (x) projection of the mouse on the response
scale was analyzed]. The position of the computer mouse was
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FIGURE 5 | Screen used to assess the image by a Pole/Jew.
measured every 500 ms (1/2 s). After the study, the person
received 5 PLN in remuneration.
Results
First, spontaneous mouse movements made while thinking about
an evaluation of the paintings by a Pole were analyzed (see
Figure 6). Then variance analysis was conducted.
Ratings of the painting depended on the conditions of
cognitive resources availability, F(1,38) = 4.44, p = 0.04. η2 = 0.10.
There were no significant changes when the dynamics of the
evaluations in time were taken into consideration, both with
and without the distractor (p > 0.05). The dynamics of the
evaluations with the distractor, however, were close to significant
F(1,14) = 3.85, p = 0.07; η2 = 0.19. Therefore, post hoc pairwise
comparison tests were used (LSD∗ method of the smallest
significant difference) to compare the evaluation of the Pole’s
image with and without the distractor. Groups with 1.5–3.5 s were
significantly different (p < 0.5).
For example, in the first moments the person in the distractor
group favored the image by a Pole (up to 3.5 s), but with time the
assessment became less favorable.
Next, multiple regression analysis was used (a step backward
selection algorithm) to find the best predictor for movements
of the mouse. The initial model consisted of: explicit attitudes
toward Poles, implicit attitudes, task conditions (distractor vs. no
distractor), and the interaction of variables (conditions ∗ explicit
attitudes, conditions ∗ implicit attitudes). Such an analysis was
performed for each time point (measured every 0.5 s) and for the
final evaluation of the painting.
The only significant (p < 0.05) predictor of spontaneous
behavior (mouse moves while pondering) was the interaction of
implicit attitudes and the conditions for the task in 2 s (η2 = 0.08);
2.5 s (η2 = 0.14); 3 s (η2 = 0.07). In the remaining time and
the final assessment (click) there were no significant effects of
the independent variables. Under the condition of low cognitive
resources availability (with a distractor), the stronger the positive
implicit attitudes the participants had toward Poles (in-group
favoritism), the more preferably the image of the Pole was
assessed, e.g., 2.5 s, η2 = 0.27. The relationship was reversed under
conditions without a distractor, i.e., the more the participants
favored the in-group (Poles), the less favorably they evaluated the
image of the Pole, although this relationship was significant only
at the level of the trend, 2.5 s, η2 = 0.07.
An interesting behavior dynamic was also observed when
the participants evaluated the image painted by the Jew
(both among the participants who were and were not
distracted). Mouse movements during the first 2 s expressed
the tendency to give a worse evaluation of the Jew’s image
(decreased ratings, Figure 7); however, with time the image
evaluations were more favorable, F(1,41) = 7.5, p < 0.01,
η2 = 0.15.
The factors that affect the mouse movements during the
assessment of the image painted by a Jewish person and the
final assessment were examined with regression analysis. The
model contained elements that were analogous to the previous
analysis, i.e., an explicit attitude toward Jews, implicit attitude, the
conditions of the task (distractor vs. no distractor), as well as the
interaction of variables (conditions ∗ overt attitude, conditions
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FIGURE 6 | Ratings of a painting depicted by a Pole (graphic scale −90 mm, +90 mm , where 0 is the center of the scale) as a function of time and the
evaluation (with or without a distractor).
FIGURE 7 | Rating of an image by a Jew (graphic scale −90 mm, +90 mm, where 0 is the center of the scale) as a function of time and the evaluation
(with or without a distractor).
∗ implicit attitude). The only significant predictor of behavior
(p < 0.05) was the interaction of explicit attitude and task
conditions: 2 s (η2 = 0.07); 2.5 s (η2 = 0.06); 3 s (η2 = 0.10); 3.5 s
(η2 = 0.16).
In the remaining time and the final assessment (click) there
was no significant effect of the independent variables highlighted.
An additional analysis showed that under the conditions without
the distractor the evaluations were consistent with the explicit
attitudes: the more positive the attitude participants had, the
more they liked the Jewish image (2–4 s), e.g., 3.5 s, η2 = 0.12.
In contrast, with the distractor the relationship was reversed: the
more the person had a positive explicit attitude, the less he/she
preferably assessed the image by the Jewish person (from 2 to 4 s),
e.g., 3.5 s, η2 = 0.19.
Discussion
The pattern of results turned out to be more complex than
expected. The hypotheses were supported primarily under
conditions with the distractor and when participants were
evaluating the image painted by a Pole. It was observed that
between the 2nd and 3rd second the Polish artist was favored
(the respondents moved the mouse to the right). Additionally,
we studied to what extent those spontaneous assessments (mouse
movements before the decision) were associated with implicit
attitudes (IAT). The results confirmed that the IAT predicted
spontaneous mouse movements during the evaluation of the
image painted by a Pole.
When there was no distraction and the Pole’s painting
was judged, paradoxically, it was found that the stronger the
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implicit in-group favoritism the participants had, the worse
they assessed the Pole’s image. Fazio et al. (1995) received
analogous results in the relationship between attitudes of white
Americans against African-Americans (as measured by affective
priming) and declarations. It turned out that among those white
Americans who had egalitarian values, the stronger the implicit
prejudice they had against African-Americans, the more tolerant
the attitude toward them they declared. It can be assumed
that students in Experiment 2 were guided by the principle of
egalitarianism. In order to inhibit an undesirable, i.e., for them,
implicit in-group preference, the participants assessed the Pole’s
painting worse probably on the basis of compensation.
There was no relationship between the IAT and a spontaneous
evaluation of the image painted by a Jew. The lack of this
dependence may be associated with the properties of the IAT
method. It has two categories (Polish vs. Jewish) and it is
impossible to evaluate how much of an effect the IAT is an
expression of in-group preference (Polish) and how much of
out-group discrimination. In this study the IAT effect could be
primarily an expression of implicit in-group favoritism (Polish)
and, therefore, significant correlations were obtained only with
the assessment of the Pole’s image. In order to verify this
hypothesis, it would be helpful to use one category in the IAT,
or the GNAT method (Nosek and Banaji, 2001).
Noticing the impact of implicit in-group favoritism (Poles)
and no significant out-group derogation also has an alternative
explanation. Favoring the “in-group” is an automatic behavior
that would ensure the survival of the individual because of it one
can always count on support from members of one’s own group.
Another consequence of in-group favoritism is to discriminate
against the out-group, which is not always present (Perdue et al.,
1990; Otten and Moskowitz, 2000). Discrimination toward the
“out-group” can be more thoughtful behavior. Therefore, only
explicit attitudes influenced this behavior.
If this interpretation were correct, it would mean a significant
limitation associated with the use of the “mouse method.”
Studies have shown that implicit attitudes toward Jews may
manifest themselves in an automatic way, including in non-
verbal behavior (Maliszewski, 2011). The “mouse procedure”
would reveal, however, only the strongest automatic processes
associated with in-group favoritism.
The reason for the smaller significant effects than expected
may also be related to the confounding variables of the same
method. In Study 2 the mouse cursor was not placed in the middle
of the screen. It was at the point where the subjects had finished
the previous task. This problem will be solved in subsequent
studies by appropriately placing the board prior to the task. Then
the subject will be asked to move the cursor to a designated point
and will click on it (this point will be located in the middle of the
scale of the task to the right).
In Study 2, normalization of spontaneous mouse movements
gave a similar pattern of results as the raw data, so there was no
need to describe it. The decisions were much quicker than in
Study 1, because in Study 2 the participants had a trial task to
complete and the task was simpler – the evaluation of the painting
(the amount of information to process) than the division of the
money after the task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
The experiments conducted here confirm that the first
spontaneous movements of a computer mouse may reveal
selfish behavior and might be an expression of in-group
favoritism.
Study 1 showed that in the first seconds the participants split
the money in a selfish way, but with time they behaved more
altruistically. These results can be interpreted in terms of complex
systems (cf. Vallacher and Nowak, 1994). When subjects adapt
to the situation of the distribution of money (in the first few
seconds), the role of the simpler mechanisms is crucial, e.g.,
favoring egoistic solutions. In this scenario normative and moral
structures are probably not available and the subjects behave
in a selfish manner. With time, however, the importance of
more complex mechanisms, such as norms and values, could
increase. Consequently, in the following seconds the subjects
behave in a more altruistic manner. This process is slower when
the distractor works. Most probably the distractor absorbs the
cognitive resources of the participants and they cannot apply
them to distribution of wealth based on the standards and
values of people. Similar results can be observed in classic
studies by Darley and Latane (1968) on the determinants of
support behavior, i.e., where external factors such as, for instance,
haste, or the number of people or uncertainty, proved to
negatively modify the desire to help. This may prove the impact
of automated, coarse heuristics counteracting helping in such
situations in contrast to the situation without haste, with a small
number of other people, tending to consciously aid activities.
Garcia et al. (2002) showed that priming a group context by
asking participants to imagine being in a group reduced the
willingness to help in a subsequent task (i.e., minutes volunteered
for another experiment) in line with an (implicit) bystander
effect.
The prevailing amount of research supports the hypothesis in
seeming opposition to Study 1, i.e., that humans are altruistic
when responses are required with time pressure or/and low
cognitive resources (Rand et al., 2012; Lotz, 2015). We claim that
it is only a superficial contradiction and that there is no conflict
between automatic and deliberative responses in the context of
cooperation. Study 1’s results show that people on an automatic
level can be selfish or altruistic, and that this depends on the
time of reaction. At first the subjects behave selfishly because the
primary purpose of pursuing the self-interest is operating (van
den Bos et al., 2006). Later, norms of fairness may be applied (if
the task solicits them and they are available).
People are not selfish or altruistic by nature. Their reaction
depends on the situation: the salience of cues in the performed
task but also on the availability of their heuristics pro-selfs vs.
pro-socials. Perugini et al. (2011) assumed that, “the perception
of certain features of the task (the environment) can solicit
a heuristic (or behavioral schema) as long as there is an
association between the environmental cues and some related
motivationally-imbued cognitive activities,” e.g., dark rooms
promote egoistic behaviors (Zhong et al., 2010), clean scents lead
to altruistic behavior (Liljenquist et al., 2010), and bright cues are
perceived intuitively as well (Meier et al., 2004).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 January 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 13
fpsyg-08-00013 January 18, 2017 Time: 17:59 # 14
Maliszewski et al. Movements of Computer Mouse
The theoretical framework which assumes a similar approach
including both the context and individual differences is the Social
Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH, Rand et al., 2014; Rand, 2016).
Its basic assumption is that “behavior that maximizes payoffs
in the long run is automated as a social heuristic,” i.e., persons
who are able to automate both altruistic and selfish behaviors.
However, Rand (2016) assumes that generally “intuition should
favor cooperation, given the pervasiveness of mechanisms (e.g.,
repeated interactions, concerns about reputation) that make
cooperation advantageous in daily life in the long run.” On the
reflective level, people take into consideration different features
which can inhibit the application of the intuitive response, which
is usually cooperative. Rand (2016) argues that “deliberation will
favor either cooperation or non-cooperation depending on the
individual’s explicit beliefs about which behavior will maximize
his or her payoff.”
Dynamics of Implicit Attitudes’ Influence
on Behavior
A meta-analysis conducted by Greenwald et al. (2009) of 61
studies on the relation of attitude to behavior revealed that the
implicit attitude is a better predictor than the explicit attitude of
behaviors that are socially “sensitive” and those that are difficult
to control, e.g., in the areas of stereotypes and prejudices (r = 0.25
and r = 0.13). In contrast, the explicit attitude has more influence
than the implicit attitude on consumer behaviors (r = 0.71 and
r = 0.40) and election (r = 0.67 and r = 0.41).
The phenomenon of in-group favoritism is incompatible with
social egalitarian values. Many studies on the minimal group
paradigm showed that a random division of people into two
groups, e.g., possessing a red or green pen, was enough to
create an in-group favoritism reaction (Tajfel, 1978). Ashburn-
Nardo et al. (2001) showed that even a random assignment of
respondents to groups labeled as preferring one of two fake
painters (Quan or Xanthie) was enough to observe implicit
preference for one or the other painter in the IAT task, e.g., those
who were labeled “preferring Quan” also preferred Quan more
than Xanthie at an implicit level. Because the “preference label”
was assigned randomly, it had nothing to do with the actual
preference for a particular painter but had a much more basic
character.
Study 2 also showed in-group favoritism measured by the
IAT. Polish students preferred Poles to Jews at an implicit
level. At the explicit level their attitudes were not significantly
different. The implicit in-group favoritism predicted spontaneous
reactions during an evaluation of a painting made by a Pole.
This relationship between implicit attitudes and behavior was
dependent on the participant’s availability of cognitive resources,
type of reactions (spontaneous vs. deliberative) and its time (first
reaction or after a few seconds).
Activation of the implicit attitude is inevitable, but its
application to generate behaviors depends on a person’s cognitive
resources (Devine, 1989; Gilbert and Hixon, 1991; Blair and
Banaji, 1996). When resources are not available, and the person
cannot think over his or her behavior, then the implicit attitude
is activated. In a study by Friese et al. (2008), cognitive resources
were experimentally manipulated. It turned out that in the group
with limited cognitive resources the amount of chips eaten was
associated with implicit attitudes. However, in those individuals
whose capacity was not limited, a significant relationship with
explicit attitudes was observed. Similarly, in the following study,
when the evaluation distractor was activated, assessment was
related to implicit attitudes.
It should be noted, however, that even with limited cognitive
resources, the impact of implicit attitude concerned only
spontaneous behaviors (the first moves of the mouse), and not a
final decision or final assessment (a click on the scale). Implicit
attitudes are associated with “spontaneous” behavior that is
difficult to control (cf. Dovidio et al., 1997; Marsh et al., 2001;
Perugini, 2005).
Another element is the reaction time. As the mouse
movements of the respondents showed, the first reactions were
associated with implicit attitudes, then the explicit attitude
would take over the regulatory role whose application requires
more time. Studies using neuroimaging suggest that, depending
on the moment in which certain reactions are examined,
different manifestations of attitudes appear. In one of the studies
(Cunningham et al., 2004), the images of African-Americans
and white Americans were presented to participants for a very
short period of time of 30 ms, which prevented reflection
(automatic process) and for a longer period of time, i.e., 525 ms
(reflective process). When the images were presented for a short
period of time, activation of the amygdala (negative affect) was
significantly correlated with the implicit attitude toward African-
Americans (r = 0.79), while there was no relationship with the
explicit attitude. The arousal of the amygdala is observed, among
others, during an automatic response to a negative affective
(Cunningham et al., 2003) and in fear conditioning (LeDoux,
1996). When the presentation time was longer (525 ms) there
were no differences in the degree of activation of the amygdala
but in areas of the prefrontal cortex, which indicated that there
was a reflective process.
The relationship between implicit attitude and behavior
may be more complex, which is shown by the impact
of the implicit attitude in conditions without a distractor.
Then the implicit attitude, i.e., in-group favoritism, may be
inconsistent with the egalitarian values and the person can
offset its effect by denying out-group preference (Maliszewski,
2011). These dynamic dependences are identified if the
measurement concerns the final decision, not the process
of its making. The mouse method may be helpful in its
determination.
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